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4.1. Brady Bonds as a Payment
Instrument in Privatization
Most of the measures for reducing Bulgaria's foreign
debt and servicing the same by concluding Brady Bond
transactions with the London Club creditors were complet-
ed by the end of 1994. Meanwhile, the bad loans of the pre-
transition period, accumulated by state enterprises in state
banks, were transformed into official domestic debt. As a
result, by the end of 1994 Bulgaria faced a substantial
domestic debt of BGN 273.7 million (USD 5.05 billion) and
foreign debt amounting USD 10.3 billion. The domestic
debt consisted largely – 57.2% or BGN 156.6 million (USD
2.89 billion) of government bonds issued to transform the
debts of state-owned companies into official debt. At the
same time, the largest share of foreign debt was in Brady
Bonds – 50.1% or USD 5.1 billion. 
During the same year, steps were taken towards allevi-
ating the country's debt burden and simultaneously stimu-
lating the privatization process. These measures involved
introducing regulations to govern debt conversion. They
were part of the government's general market adjustment
strategy aimed at sustainable growth through private sector
development and investment stimulation.
The main feature of all the regulations introduced to
deal with the legal, institutional and procedural aspects of
the debt-equity swap mechanism was debt annulment by
converting government debt in state assets. Naturally, con-
cluding such transactions, swapping debt against property,
largely depends on the attractiveness, liquidity and quality of
assets to be invested in. Another concern is the careful
selection of debt instruments, based on the country's strate-
gic goals for government debt reduction and mid-term fis-
cal stabilization.
At first, two major types of government bonds for con-
verting debt to property were introduced: 
– government domestic debt bonds, issued under the
provisions of the Law on the Settlement of Non-Performing
Credits Negotiated Before 31 December 1990 [42] (These
bonds are called ZUNKs, a Bulgarian abbreviation of the
Law), 
– Brady Bonds, issued under an Agreement with the
London Club since March 1994.
The Privatization Act stipulates that government debt
creditors may participate in the privatization process with
their claims by following the procedures set by the Council
of Ministers and which determine the CM's legal activity in
this area. It also regulates all activities related to conversion
of debt to property for each specific debt instrument.
The conditions and procedures for participating in pri-
vatization through foreign debt government bonds have
been regulated by two successive ordinances of the CM
[43]. These ordinances defined two categories of govern-
ment debt bonds that may be used in privatization transac-
tions, both in accordance with the clauses of the London
Club Agreement. The first of these are Discount Bonds
(DISCs), the second being Front-Loaded Interest Reduction
Bonds (FLIRBs) (Bond requisites are explained in Appen-
dix). There are no restrictions concerning the entities per-
mitted to use such instruments in privatization transactions,
i.e. they may be applied by both individuals and companies,
after presenting all necessary papers in accordance with the
country's currency regulations.
Several important amendments were introduced by the
ordinance of 1997. Firstly, the newly adopted ordinance
stipulated the procedure for acquiring and using foreign
Part 4
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[42]  Officially published in the State Gazette No. 110 in 1994.
[43] Ordinances on the terms and conditions of participation in privatization with Bulgarian foreign debt bonds, adopted respectively with Decree
of the Council of Ministers # 278 of 25 November 1994, and Decree of the Council of Ministers # 502 of 30 December 1997.
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debt bonds as a payment instrument in privatization trans-
actions, since these are considered useful both by the
investors and other institutions involved in this process. 
Secondly, it introduces a differentiated approach to swap
quotas for various types of bonds, i.e. when concluding a
privatization contract, no more than 50% of the acquired
stock, shares or property value may be covered by DISCs
and no more than 75%  in the case of FLIRBs.
Thirdly, the practice of determining the BGN denomina-
tion on the basis of the BNB average fixed exchange rate is
no longer acceptable. This is due to the accelerated dynam-
ics of the BGN/USD exchange rate in the recent past, which
in practice brought about distortions in BGN prices. For this
reason, BGN values are calculated by multiplying the USD
value by the BGN/USD exchange rate on the same day
bonds are transferred to the account of the Ministry of
Finance.
Finally, the first of these ordinances, that of 1994, speci-
fied that payment with Brady Bonds is only permitted where
the buyer undertakes not to transfer abroad the securities
shares or enterprises acquired in a privatization transaction for
at least 4 years, and likewise not to transfer abroad the liqui-
dation share or price received following the sale of the securi-
ties, shares or enterprises acquired in the transaction for at
least 10 years. However, the later ordinance, that of 1997,
abrogated this condition.
The accepted value of Brady Bonds was determined as
follows:
– the value of DISCs is calculated in USD equal to their
face value, whereas FLIRBs – are calculated with a 50%
reduction in their face value,
– the BGN value of Bonds is calculated as an amount
equal to the USD value using an exchange rate calculated for
each specific privatization transaction, namely the average
fixed exchange rate of the Bulgarian National Bank for the
past six months (the period starts from the day the respec-
tive privatization transaction is signed).
According to the ordinances, Brady Bonds may not be
used for: 
– settling investment obligations or forfeiture under pri-
vatization contracts,
– state taxes and fees,
– other state and municipal claims,
– privatization though open sales of shares,
– participation in municipal privatization.
Experience has unearthed a whole set of problems in
using foreign debt bonds and other payment instruments
in privatization transactions and these have still not been
settled by the above-mentioned regulation. This has
resulted in the need to amend and supplement the exist-
ing regulations. In early 1995, an amendment [44] to the
ordinance governing swaps with Brady Bonds resulted in:
– The introduction of limitations for capital repatria-
tion and exportation of profits (such a restriction is pre-
sent in all debt conversion programs). In reality, profit
obtained through acquired stocks, shares or enterprises
cannot be transferred earlier than four years following
the conclusion of the transaction. Capital transfers (the
liquidation quota or price of the enterprise sold) are
restricted for a 10-year period. In general, these limita-
tions are intended to improve the country's short-term
balance of payment.
– The introduction of ceilings for swap volumes - foreign
debt bonds cannot be used for payment of more than 50%
of stocks, shares or property acquired through privatization
transactions.
– The recognition of buyers' claims from calculated but
unpaid interest on interest coupons as of the day bonds are
obtained. These receivables are to balance that portion of
the price of shares, stocks or property acquired through a
privatization transaction which is not covered by foreign
debt bonds.
4.2. Domestic Debt Bonds as a Payment
Instrument in Privatization Transactions
Five types of domestic debt bonds have been recog-
nized as legal tender in privatization transactions. Firstly,
ZUNKs were legally introduced as a privatization pay-
ment instrument in early 1994 by an ordinance of the
CM [45]. Between its introduction and abrogation, slight-
ly less than two years, this ordinance was amended and
supplemented several times, in order to introduce opera-
tional improvements in the conversion process and of
course, to develop the secondary bonds market. In late
1995, it was followed by another ordinance of the CM
[46], which introduced three other types of long-term
domestic debt bonds as legal tender in privatization trans-
actions.
The following are most important new aspects of the
above-mentioned and currently active ordinance:
– The types of long-term government bonds that may be
converted to property were increased. At a later stage, this
[44] Decree of the Council of Ministers # 41 of 20 February 1995.
[45] Ordinance on the terms and conditions of participation in privatization with ZUNKs, adopted with Decree of the Council of Ministers # 36
of 16 February 1994.
[46] Ordinance on the terms and conditions of participation in privatization with ZUNKs, bonds as per CMD # 244/1991, CMD # 186/1993, and
CMD # 3/1994, adopted with Decree of the Council of Ministers # 221 of 22 November 1995.
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will actually unify the statute concerning stocks originating
from converting company debt to government debt accord-
ing to the structural reform carried out during the period
1991–1994 (the requisites for the different bonds are quot-
ed in Appendix).
– The ordinance abolished restrictions on using long-
term government bonds whether acquired from the BNB or
commercial banks and transforming bad loans into bonds, as
a payment instrument in privatization transactions. This is a
very important step towards establishing a real market price
and free secondary trading, as well as creating incentives for
investors. 
– The ordinance also introduced comprehensive proce-
dural and institutional regulations for using domestic debt
bonds as a payment instrument in privatization transactions.
Of all the domestic debt securities, ZUNKs were those
most often used in privatization payments. Both BGN- and
USD-denominated ZUNKs may be used for purchase of
stocks, shares, enterprises and/or separate units of state
property, by:
a) commercial banks which transformed bad loans into
bonds and
b) private individuals and companies that have purchased
such bonds from the central bank or else commercial bank
bonds from (a).
The value of ZUNKs in BGN, denominated in USD, is
calculated at the BNB exchange rate on the day bonds are
transferred to the Ministry of Finance [47].
The above-described participants in ZUNK transactions
must adhere to the provisions of Chapters 5 and 6 of the
LTPSME. The imposed restriction was intended to provide
commercial banks that have transformed bad loans to long-
term government bonds the opportunity to achieve rapid
and effectively low-income assets, i.e. ZUNKs. This restric-
tion is no longer in force.
Following the initial regulation of ZUNKs, these bonds
were used at their face value as a payment instrument in
privatization transactions. However, according to the
BNB's ordinance of April 1994 [48], the market price of
ZUNKs is to be calculated by commercial banks, but may
not be lower than the minimum price calculated by the
BNB (which is based on their discounted value plus a spe-
cific premium for using them in the privatization process).
For instance, over the 1994–1996 period the minimum
price for BGN-denominated bonds with a face value of
1,000 varied between BGN 665.60 and 700.00, while for
the USD-denominated bonds varied between USD 90.00
and 91.77 per USD 100 face value. Bearing in mind the
need to stimulate investor interest, the CM adopted
decrees, according to which the above-mentioned premi-
ums (the incentive for using bonds in the privatization
process) were set at:
– 40% till 31 December 1995 [49],
– 40% till 30 June 1996 [50],
– 30% till 31 December 1996 [51].
In regulating swaps with domestic debt bonds, the
ordinance also envisages long-term bonds being accepted
at their face value premium, as defined by the Council of
Ministers, when they are used in privatization transac-
tions. Actually, after 1996 this premium was "zero", i.e.
there was no such premium, due to the low minimum
prices of the BNB (a 350 BGN premium for a ZUNK with
a face value of 1000 BGN and a USD 45 premium for a
ZUNK with a face value of USD 100). These provisions
do not limit free secondary trading of stocks. This means
that investors may apply a reasonable reduction, formed
as a spread between the face value and the present value
of the securities. This Ordinance # 14 of the BNB for
defining the minimum prices of ZUNKs, was later abro-
gated.
According to the currently active regulations on using
domestic debt bonds in privatization payments, there are
no limitations on capital repatriation or exportation of
profits, nor with regard to the volume of domestic debt
swaps. On the other hand, calculated but unpaid interest
on interest coupons (as of the date bonds are acquired), is
not balanced against the price of the acquired shares or
privatized property. It is assumed that this interest is neg-
ligible. 
4.3. Volume of Government Bonds Used
as Legal Tender in Privatization
The total volume of debt instruments used as payment
instruments in privatization transactions, including both
Brady Bonds and domestic debt bonds, was USD 412.7 mil-
lion (see Table 4-1). This means that equity-debt swaps
account for almost 30% of the total fiscal effect (cash pro-
ceeds plus debt reduction due to swaps).
[47] According to the Ordinance on the terms and conditions of acquiring, servicing, and repaying ZUNKs, adopted with Decree of the Council of
Ministers # 33 of 14 February 1994.
[48]  Ordinance on the sanctioning of the commercial banks for losses from transaction with long-tern government bonds under their market price,
adopted with Decision of the BNB Governing Board # 125 of 12 April 1994; abolished on 12 August 1997.
[49] According to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 89 of 19 April 1995.
[50] According to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 263 of 29 December 1996.
[51] According to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 263 of 29 December 1996.
38
Julian Pañków (ed.)
CASE Reports No. 37
Almost 2/3 of the total volume of government bonds
used in privatization payments has been domestic debt
bonds (in the Table 4-2, both domestic and foreign debt
bonds are estimated in USD for better comparison). The
largest share of domestic debt bonds were USD-denomi-
nated ZUNKs – USD 201 million or 3/4 of the total volume
of domestic debt bonds used.
Investors clearly preferred FLIRBs in their payments with
Bulgarian Brady Bonds, since they used such bonds with a
total face value of approximately USD 118 million (see Table
below). Within the range of opportunities for domestic debt
to property swaps, four types of government bonds were
used (out of the five legally permitted). The largest share
were USD-denominated ZUNKs, whereas the largest debt
Table 4-1. Cash vs. debt instruments in privatization payments
Year Cash proceeds (million USD) Debt instruments used
(million USD)
1993 11.3 -
1994 21.2 25.6
1995 58.7 147.3
1996 85.0 46.0
1997 325.3 52.1
1998 201.3 121.1
1999 282.6 20.7
Total 985.4 412.7
Source: MF, BNB, IME's, own calculations
[52] Bonds issued according to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 186 of 24 September 1993.
[53] Bonds issued according to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 3 of 18 January 1994.
Table 4-2. Volume of government securities used as legal tender in privatization transactions (million USD)
Domestic Debt BondsYear
BGN-denominated USD-denominated
Brady Bonds Total
1994 25.58 - - 25.58
1995 27.33 7.50 112.44 147.28
1996 10.26 14.37 21.35 45.98
1997 5.81 39.64 6.62 52.06
1998 2.41 118.72 - 121.13
1999 - 20.70 - 20.70
Total 71.39 200.93 140.41 412.73
Note: BGN-denominated government bonds are: 1) ZUNK bonds denominated in leva; 2) bonds issued under CM Decree No. 186/1993; and
3) bonds issued under CM Decree No. 3/1994. The USD-denominated domestic debt bonds are ZUNKs denominated in USD. The figures for 1999
do not include December
Source: MF, BNB, IME's, own calculations
Table 4-3.  Volume of different bonds used and debt reduction in the period 1994–1999
Type of government bonds Total volume used Total debt reduction
DISCs USD 22.8 million 1.24%
FLIRBs USD 117.6 million 7.09%
USD-denominated ZUNKs USD 200.9 million 10.77%
BGN-denominated ZUNKs BGN 16.8 million 63.62%
Bonds as per CMD # 186/1993 [52] BGN 2.3 million 36.38%
Bonds as per CMD # 3/1994 [53] BGN 0.8 million 38.40%
Note: Total Brady Bonds debt reduction is estimated on the basis of the volume of bond issues; for domestic debt bonds, the basis is the respec-
tive outstanding debt at the time of the legal introduction of the swap mechanism
Source: Ministry of Finance, IME's, own calculations
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reduction was by BGN-denominated ZUNKs (about 64% of
the volume of debt outstanding as of late 1995).
The overall reduction of official debt through equity-
debt swaps was about 2.7%, estimated on the basis of the
debt at the end of 1994 (the BGN-denominated debt was
converted into dollars for the purposes of the calculation).
Over the period 1995–1997, the practice whereby
investors used foreign debt bonds as a payment instrument
in privatization transactions was due to the income guaran-
teed with bonds payment, as well as the opportunity to
convert debt to property. For the purpose of the present
report, the value of Brady Bonds in BGN is calculated using
the average weighted BGN/USD exchange rate for the
respective year, bearing in mind the fact that privatization
revenues are received in BGN.
We may conclude that the mechanism for converting
debt to property is not a panacea for solving the country's
problems, debts and development difficulties. This mecha-
nism should be recognized as a useful but limited tool for
decreasing the nation's debts and attracting new invest-
ment. Due to its weaknesses, this mechanism should not be
regarded as a universal instrument. The goals achieved
should be assessed within the context of the entire macro-
economic strategy for the country's development.
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5.1. The Case of Bulgaria
Probably the best way to analyze the costs of Bulgaria's
privatization is to examine the revenue side of the non-bud-
getary fund called the Fund to cover the expenses arising from
the privatization of state-owned companies. In the period
1993–1998, this covered the expenses of all central privatiza-
tion bodies, but was administered by only one of them,
namely the Privatization Agency. After 1998, it was split into
several funds, each of them covering the expenses of sepa-
rate bodies. The tables below are based on the allocation of
privatization revenues to those funds. This allocation serves
as the upper limit for the expenses of these privatization bod-
ies. It does not allow for separation of the costs of proce-
dures, from one side or the costs of maintaining privatization
bodies, from the other.
On average, the costs of privatization were 3.7% of
the total cash revenues from privatization. The percent-
age of spending on an annual basis is difficult to calculate,
as the Table provides only the allocation of revenues, i.e.
the portion of revenues that could be spent in the follow-
ing years.
Although the figures in the Table above do no repre-
sent the actual spending in the years indicated, it is easy
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to follow the trend of privatization expenditure. Estimat-
ed in real terms (1993 BGN), the costs changed only
slightly over the period 1993–1997, but increased dra-
matically in the years 1998 and 1999, with costs in 1999
being 9 times higher than in 1997.
In examining the trends for numbers of transactions and
costs by years, practically no correlation may be established
between the costs of privatization and the number of trans-
actions. The same holds true for the relationship between
the volume of privatization revenues and costs. However, a
kind of economy-of-scale level was reached in 1997, when
both total volume of costs and costs per transaction were at
their lowest for the whole period.
Opportunity cost of preferential sales
to insiders
The direct expenditures in the privatization process
seem to be insignificant, considering their 3.7% of cash pay-
ments. They become even more negligible if we view them
as a share not only of the cash proceeds but also of total
payments (including debt instruments) or total payments
contracted. However, the opportunity cost of the chosen
privatization model, in terms of missed cash proceeds,
should be considered in order to fully appreciate privatiza-
tion costs. In section 8, we stressed the opportunity cost of
the prevailing use of closed procedures and the inclusion of
non-price commitments in privatization contracts. Here we
examine the cost of preferential sales to insiders.
Three types of preferences to insiders have been
legally permitted since the very beginning of the process.
The Privatization Act of 1992 formulated these prefer-
ences in the following manner:
– Up to 20% of the shares in a company subject to
privatization may be sold to insiders [54] at preferential
terms; the price is 50% of their value, which is deter-
mined administratively.
– Any management-employee company, in which at
least 20% of the current staff are shareholders, may buy
out the company subject to privatization, without any
opening tender or auction procedure; thus, the price of
such a management-employee buy-out (MEBO) is the
value of the company, which is assessed administratively.
– A management-employee company may use a
deferred payment scheme (up to ten years) when select-
ed as the new owner.
It has been the tradition of the privatization bodies
that in most cases, a residual stake (of up to 20%) has
been offered to insiders. In almost all cases, these prefer-
ential shares were sold.
The technique of sales without tender or auction,
although rarely used for the privatization of whole compa-
nies (only 8.1% of all the transactions by the central priva-
tizing agents), was prevalent in the privatization of the sepa-
rate units of companies (49.1%). The price at which such
buy-outs took place was based on an evaluation of the unit.
Since insiders had the chance to influence these evaluations
(for they submitted most of the information required by the
evaluating agent), most of these companies and their sepa-
rate units may safely be considered undervalued.
The privatization law (especially its amendments in
1994–1996) introduced a special regime for MEBOs. In
[54] The employees that have worked at least for two years; the employees who have been dismissed from the company no more than 14 years
ago; the pensioners who retired no more than 10 years ago; managers, working not under labor contract, who have managed the company at least for
one year.
Table 5-1. Costs of privatization in Bulgaria
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Million USD 0.6 1.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 11.3 16.7 36.0
% of revenues 5.6 5.6 4.5 2.1 0.6 5.6 5.9 3.7
Source: Ministry of Finance, IME's, own calculations
Table 5-2.  Costs, revenues and number of transactions
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Revenues
(Million USD)
11.3 21.2 58.7 85.0 325.3 201.3 282.6 985.4
Costs (Million
USD)
0.6 1.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 11.3 16.7 36.0
Transactions 62 165 309 515 590 1 110 1 224 3 975
Cost per
transaction
(Thousand
USD)
10.2 7.2 8.5 3.5 3.1 10.2 13.6 9.1
Source: Privatization Agency, Ministry of Finance, IME's, own calculations
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particular, a preferential payment system allows manage-
ment-employee buyer companies to make a down pay-
ment amounting to 10% of the price offered, whilst sched-
uling the remaining 90% through installments over a peri-
od of ten years. It was not until 1999, that privatization
bodies were required to discount the price offered by
insider companies by the ranking of offers. In practice, this
gave the management-employee companies the opportu-
nity to outbid any competition with only a slightly higher
price, but also one which was due in 10 years. A classic
example of such an advantage is provided in the box
below. Following the early 1999 amendment to the Priva-
tization Act, privatizing bodies were required to apply a
discount, but only a 10% discount was applicable for the
whole 10-year period. The situation was amended at the
beginning of 2000, since when a 10% discount is due each
year of the deferred payment.
This preference was the main reason for the huge share
of MEBOs – 44.3% in the period 1993–1998. However, the
isolated figures for 1998 alone indicate a considerably higher
percentage of 73.4% [55]. In 1999, management-employee
companies won a third of all privatization contracts.
A striking illustration of the hidden cost of the deferred
payment preference may be seen in a comparison between
contractual payments in such MEBOs and the actual pro-
ceeds in real terms. All such transactions contracted before
early 1997 (a period of hyperinflation) required new owners
to pay only a ludicrous fraction (in real terms) of the sum for
which they had contracted. For instance, one such MEBO
from late 1996 required the new owner to pay the first
installment of the deferred payment in late 1997 (with infla-
tion at 579%), when it was almost 7 times lower (in real
terms) than the sum contracted.
The up to 20% stakes reserved for employees have
probably had a insignificant hidden cost in terms of missed
revenues, compared to the other two preferences -
deferred payments and sales without auction or tender.
Nevertheless, in the Table below, we hypothetically rep-
resent the missed revenues of the stakes reserved for
insiders in some of the largest privatization transactions.
In this hypothetical example, we assume that the reserved
shares, if offered for competitive sale, would have had the
same price as the majority stake shares.
Finally, although it is difficult to calculate, we believe
that insider preferences have involved a high opportunity
cost in terms of missed higher prices due to two particu-
lar effects of the preference arrangement (especially the
deferred payment schemes and the sales without tender
or auction), namely:
– limited demand for the companies (or their separate
units);
– the incentives for insiders to influence the valuation
of the companies (or their separate units).
This eventually meant the formal undervaluing of com-
panies and more importantly, only one (price competitive)
buyer, namely the management-employee company.
CASE Reports No. 37
[55] Privatization Agency, Privatization Strategy and Programme, no date (1999), p. 1. (actually, 1998 Annual Report of the Privatization Agency).
Table 5-3. Number and share of MEBOs without tender or auction in the privatization of whole companies and separate units (all cen-
tral privatizing bodies) 1 Jan 1993 – 30 Nov 1999
Number Share (%)
Whole companies 154 8.1
Separate units 931 49.1
Source: Privatization Agency
Table 5-4. Consumer Price Index (1993 = 100)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
CPI 100 132 214 477 5 641 6 899 7 058 7 468
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1999, own calculations
Table 5-5. Opportunity Cost of Reserved Stakes 
Company Majority Stake
Sold (%)
Price of Majority
Stake (Million USD)
Reserved
Stake (%)
Opportunity cost of Reserved
stake’s (Million USD)
MDK* 56 80.0 14 20
Sheraton 67 22.3 18 6
Aroma 67 8.41 20 2.51
Eltos* 55 7.65 20 2.78
Burgasko Pivo 67 5.02 20 1.50
Note: * In the case of these companies the reserved stake includes the reservation for restitution claims.
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The Case of Rodopa
An examination of the origin of the management-
employee company's funds must obviously have been nec-
essary, because the District Attorney in the town of Shumen
asked the local police chief to investigate the case. Accord-
ing to a letter from the Attorney General to the Privatiza-
tion Agency, an investigation is necessary "because of the
potential for criminal acts and unauthorized spending of
Rodopa funds, when the company made a deposit to take
part in the bid for 67% of Rodopa. It is believed the deposit
amounting to $39,000 was taken from the cash account of
the privatized slaughterhouse.
Trade-off between Price and Non-price Future
Commitments
The concept of privatization prevalent among the staff
of the privatizing bodies is of a process that aims at develop-
ing the company, i.e. their task is not only to transfer prop-
erty, but also to find "good" new owners committed to
"developing" the companies. This leads to the persistent use
of "closed" procedures, i.e. tenders and negotiations (see
Table 5-6). These techniques in turn allow for the inclusion
of a variety of non-price future commitments in the privati-
zation contracts, such as the average number of staff to be
employed, investment plans, preservation of the company's
previous activities, etc [56]. 
We believe that "closed" procedures reduce the poten-
tial amount of privatization revenues, at least for the fol-
lowing  reasons:
1) the trade-off between the price and the non-price
commitments,
2) the unclear rules of procedure reduce the number of
interested investors, which means lower demand and thus
a lower price for the company,
3) discretionary power, resulting from the unclear rules
for buyer selection may, in certain cases, mean that the
highest price offered is not the one selected.
Although it is difficult to estimate, there is a certain
trade-off between the price offered and the promises made
by the new owner. The reason is that the assessment of
offers is made on the basis of both price offered and busi-
ness plan submitted. This means that a buyer should have
the best possible comprehensive offer rather than highest
offer price. A good example is the weightings recently
applied by the Ministry of Economy in the ranking of offers
– 0.3 is given to the future employment program and 0.7 to
the price.
However, these weightings are not always common and
are almost never announced to the candidates (actually, the
recent practice employed by the Ministry of Economy
should be considered an exception). In practice, this makes
the rules of procedure totally confusing, which in turn
reduces investor interest. This reduces the demand for and
the eventual price of the privatized company.
[56]   For detailed review of privatization procedures and non-price future commitments see "Evaluation of the Post-Privatization Monitoring Sys-
tem in Bulgaria", CASE and IME, March 2000.
Rodopa - Shumen is one of three slaughterhouses in Bul-
garia with an export license to the member countries of the EU
(the other two are Mecom - Silistra and the slaughterhouse in
Svishtov). In late 1998, the company had liabilities amounting
to over $7 million, due the state budget, the United Bulgarian
Bank and Bank Biochim. At that time there were two main
players in the privatization bid for Rodopa Shumen - Vanbouk
and the management-employee company Rodopa - 97. Van-
bouk's bid was for $406,000 to be paid immediately in cash
and Rodopa-97's bid was for $700,000 to be paid in cash over
a ten-year period. However, when discounted with 10% for
each year of the deferred payment period, the price offered by
the management-employee company amounted to just under
$300,000. Therefore the opportunity cost of the MEBO (the
offer of $406,000) would have been too high.
However, this bid was submitted before the legal introduc-
tion of the discount procedure, which would have formally
meant that the MEBO offer was more competitive. Thus the
Executive Director of the Privatization Agency signed the con-
tract for the sale of 67% of Rodopa - Shumen with Rodopa -
97. It is believed the signing of the contract took place only an
hour after the members of the Supervisory Council decided to
review the case at their next meeting, due to uncertainty con-
cerning the origin of the management-employee company's
funds. The above concerns were aired by a company closely
related to the rejected bidder - Vanbouk.
Table 5-6.  Share of "closed" and "open" procedures in the privatization of whole companies (all central privatizing bodies)
1 Jan 1993 – 30 Nov 1999
Procedure* Share (%)
Open 7
Closed 93
* "Open" procedures are auctions and public offers; "closed" procedures are tenders and negotiations
Source: Privatization Agency
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No clear rules for buyer selection are outlined in the
Ordinance on tenders [57], where Art. 11 states that "the
buyer selected should be the one whose offer best satis-
fies the tender conditions". Neither may such rules be
found in the case of direct negotiations and indeed no
specific regulation whatsoever governs this latter proce-
dure. This makes it the least regulated and thus the most
highly discretionary privatization technique. Therefore,
the risk of losing the highest price (and even the "best"
offer, where such a complex evaluation is possible)
remains high.
For these reasons, we consider the prevailing use of
tenders and negotiation, as well as the persistent applica-
tion of non-price future commitments, to equal high
opportunity costs in terms of missed inflows of cash to
the budget. As it is impossible to measure the total
opportunity cost of this selected privatization model, we
illustrate this issue with the following two cases.
The Case of Chimko
The Case of Vinex
As in most of the cases, the delay in privatization led to
deterioration in the financial performance of Vinex. After all,
the plant is not such a large debtor – it owes the state bud-
get 1.5 million BGN and if we add the dividends, corporate
income tax etc. due the state, the total liabilities add up to
some USD 2 million. Although Vinex has current liabilities
due Reiffeisen Bank and United Bulgarian Bank, it is repaying
these regularly. In the period 1997–1998, the company was
in good financial standing and had a BGN 1.26 million and
BGN 0.4 million profit respectively. Since the end of 1999,
the financial condition of the company has deteriorated and
it is now believed to have shown a loss of BGN 0.2 million.
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[57] Adopted with a Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 155 of 14 August 1992.
Privatization of the fertilize producer Chimko commenced
in 1997 when the South Korean Daewoo and the American
Stellar Global companies showed interest in the company
which at that time was a profitable concern. Stellar Global
offered a higher price - $100.2 million. According to the Priva-
tization Agency, the negotiations with Stellar Global were halt-
ed due to the fact that the company was facing financial prob-
lems, which led to a delay in the privatization process. How-
ever the procedural delay itself led to a deterioration of the
plant's financial position, which resulted in a drastic fall in the
selling price.
In the period 1997-1999, Chimko's liabilities increased due
to higher gas prices. In 1998, new negotiations were opened,
when the minimum price was $38 million, but no buyers
appeared. A year later, a new negotiation was opened. IBE -
Trans of New York and BTC partners registered in the British
Virgin Islands submitted their offers. The Privatization Agency
chose IBE - Trans and in July last year, a privatization contract
was signed. According to the contract, a price of DM 1 million
had to be paid in and $50 million had to be invested over a
period of 3 years. The old liabilities of the company (mainly due
the state-owned gas supplier Bulgargas) amounted to DM 70
million. The company's debt decreased to about DM 54 million
after the state waived the forfeits.
Thus for a period of two years, the effective price (revenue
plus liabilities) of Chimko fell from $100.2 million to DM 55
million. At the same time the actual proceeds to the budget
were only DM 1 million (down from $100.2 million). 
Vinex - Preslav, one of the largest white wine producers,
was privatized in late 1999 after three unsuccessful privatiza-
tion procedures in a row. In the fourth procedure, two candi-
dates appeared - a former privatization fund St. Sofia and a
Bulgarian company named Perinea. The selected candidate
was St. Sofia.
However, according to the rejected bidder, Perinea's offer
was a higher price. According to Borislav Banchev, owner of
Perinea, the company offered a price for the majority of the
shares amounting to USD1.71 million and proposed a commit-
ment to invest USD5.5 million. According to Mr. Banchev, at
the beginning of the bid procedure, his company offered
USD1.1 million while the price offered by St. Sofia was even
lower. In the first phase of the negotiations, both companies
offered higher prices but the negotiations were terminated.
The fourth privatization procedure for Vinex attracted
more bidders than those previously held, probably due to the
considerable reduction in the minimum price. During the first
two privatization procedures, there was no investor interest
and in the third bid, only one offer was submitted by a man-
agement-employee company. Two years ago, the starting price
for the majority of the shares was approximately USD10 mil-
lion, whereas the last procedure involved no such fixed price.
Last summer, the condition imposed on the bidders was for
them to pay a minimum $1.9million and at that time, only a
management-employee company submitted an offer, which
later proved to be incomplete and thus the whole procedure
failed. 
The current buyer had good a chance from the very begin-
ning. Since October 1998, the Executive Director of St. Sofia,
Borislav Manachilov has been a member of the Vinex Board of
Directors. He also figured in the management of the manage-
ment-employee company that had participated in the previous
procedure. Therefore, it is no surprise that St. Sofia won the
bid so easily. 
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Liabilities connected with restitution claims
The restitution of urban property and land was the first
form of privatization undertaken in Bulgaria. Eight restitu-
tion laws (adopted in 1991–1992) governed restitution of
arable land and real estate where (and if) such existed in
kind.
The restitution of agricultural land has been the most
complicated and controversial. This was due both to the
symbolic value attached to land restitution, which trig-
gered considerable political controversy over the imple-
mentation of the policy and due to legal issues arising from
the definition of ownership of restituted land. In spite of
the relatively early adoption of the Ownership and Use of
Agricultural Land Act [58], namely by the third quarter of
1996, only 18% of the arable land subject to restitution
had actually been returned, with defined boundaries, to
its owners. At the same time, actual legal titles had been
issued for just 6% of the land. This, notwithstanding the
fact that 54% of the claims had been processed and ruled
on. A significant acceleration of the land restitution
process was observed after 1997. To a great extent this
progress was due to the amendments in the Land Law,
which aimed at strengthening ownership rights and intro-
ducing new provisions for claiming individual property
rights. As a result, by the end of 1998, 79.6% of the land
subject to restitution had been returned to its
owners/heirs [59]. By the end of December 1999, restitu-
tion of 96% of the land was reported completed. 
In the case of the restitution of urban property, the
process had a relatively faster pace. Between 1992 and
1995, over 22,000 small and medium-sized entities had
been privatized under the Restoration of the Ownership of
Nationalized Real Estate Act [60], thereby resolving the larg-
er part of the claims submitted by previous owners and their
heirs. Altogether however, the total value of restituted
property between 1992 and 1996 amounts to some 2.5%
of the country's GDP for 1996. Moreover, disputes over
property arising in connection with the later disposal of
state-owned assets have led observers to point out that
restitution ultimately slowed down the overall privatization
process in Bulgaria.
The Privatization Act reserves 10% of privatized enter-
prises for restitution claims (in addition to the 20% reserved
for insiders).
The Compensation of Owners of Nationalized Property
Act [61] adopted in 1997 was aimed at broadening the
scope of restitution of formerly confiscated urban real
estate and assets. The compensation mechanisms intro-
duced by the law were as follows:
– In the case of restitution claims against an already pri-
vatized enterprise, the claimants are compensated in the
form of shares from the state-owned stake in the enterprise
or in the form of compensatory bonds.
– In the case of restitution claims against an enterprise
prohibited for privatization, the compensation granted is in
form of compensatory bonds.
– If the enterprise has not yet been privatized, the
claimants receive shares in the company. If the value of these
shares is insufficient to cover all the claims, compensatory
bonds are to be given for the remaining part. 
If the enterprise has been privatized in full and there is
no state-owned share in its capital, the compensation grant-
ed is only in the form of compensatory bonds.
The idea of this law is simple – to create a means of pay-
ment which the government grants to those eligible for
restitution of their former properties, allowing those means
to be used in  privatization transactions, e.g. to be convert-
ed into shares. The compensation process is equal to the
possible use of so-called compensatory bonds in privatiza-
tion. The latter is a generic term for all three compensation
means, i.e. orders as such, temporary notices (which notify
possession of formerly nationalized properties) and com-
pensatory bonds for nationalized living accommodation
(houses, flats, etc.), i.e. "housing compensation orders".
District governors are entitled to register claims and
claimants. Estimation of the assets subject to compensation
is the obligation of the state bodies (principal) that own the
remaining government share after privatization. In practice,
it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of properties and
owners that will be involved in the process: properties were
transformed, estates were changed or vanished as physical
assets and the heirs of former owners have dispersed.
5.2. The Case of Poland
Table 5-7. shows that direct costs of privatization consti-
tute a decreasing fraction of total privatization revenues.
The greatest costs have obviously been connected with the
implementation of the process. For example, the cost of the
capital privatization of the first 5 companies privatized in this
way amounted to 21% [62] of privatization revenues and
13% of the value of all companies, following which, as may
be observed in Table 5-7 and Figure 5-2, the cost began to
[58] Adopted 1 March 1991.
[59] Although legal titles had been issued only for 24 % of the land.   
[60] Adopted 21 February 1992.
[61] Adopted 18 November 1997.
[62] Ba³towski, 1998.
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fall. This reduction, as noted by Ba³towski (1998) may be
linked to two factors. Firstly, since 1992 the very expensive
foreign consulting companies hired to prepare and imple-
ment the privatization procedures have been systematically
replaced by much cheaper domestic firms. The second rea-
son is that in 1995, a new law on public ordering was intro-
duced and this put much pressure and obligation on privati-
zation agencies to economize in their selection of privatiza-
tion consultants.
Likewise it is possible that the centralization of the pri-
vatization process since 1997 may also reduce the direct
costs of privatization. This means that some fixed costs or
quasi-fixed costs such as promotion and staff salaries may
now be incurred only in one ministry as opposed to several. 
However, neither the above Table nor the graph take
into account the costs of the NIF program. According to the
report of the Supreme Auditing Chamber (Najwy¿sza Izba
Kontroli - NIK) the total cost of the NIF program at the end
of 1995 was equal to 150.7 million PLZ. However 48.7 mil-
lion PLZ of this figure was mainly covered by PHARE and
USAID funds.
The other cost item in this program is the annual pay-
ment for the management of NIF assets. This payment is
paid by the State Treasury to the private companies hired by
the NIF boards. Between July 1995 and December 1996,
these payment amounted to more then 46 million USD,
approximately 115 million zlotys. However these costs must
be counted separately and for more than one reason should
not be treated as direct costs of privatization: costs related
to the NIF program are usually counted separately in all sta-
tistics, since this was not a program of privatization as such,
but rather a non-equivalent transfer of property rights.
Moreover, it was a once only action and is therefore hardly
comparable to "the rest of privatization" which is spread out
over a long period.
Costs of maintaining privatization bodies
Until 1997, it is almost impossible to asses the costs of
maintaining privatization bodies in Poland, since the privati-
zation process, as already mentioned, has been performed
by several ministries and all the country's voivodships. The
former Ministry of Ownership Transformation was not only
responsible for controlling some aspects of privatization, but
also carried out other objectives such as: monitoring and
subsidizing dependent enterprises.
Following the reform of 1997, the situation changed but
this does not mean that any exact assessment of these kinds
of costs is possible. The newly created MST is now fully
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Table 5-7. Direct costs of privatization in the years 1991–1998 (millions of PLN)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Costs as a percentage of
privatization revenues
13.8% 7.6% 5.4% 9.7% 8.2% 3.4% 1.1% 2.0% 1.0%
Source: Reports on the achievement of the state budget in the years 1991–1998 and own calculations
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Figure 5-2. Direct costs of privatization as a perentage of privatization revenues in years 1991–1998
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responsible for the entire privatization process, but privati-
zation continues to be not the only task of this ministry. 
Costs of non-equivalent privatization
"The Privatization Program up to 2001" limited the
analysis and projections of the cost of the non-equivalent
privatization program only to the distribution of free shares
to the employees of the privatized companies. It estimated
the cost of this part of the program for the period from
1998 to 2005 at 8 billion PLN (see Table 6-7). 
Initially, the Privatization Law passed by parliament on
13th July 1990 regulated the process of transferring free
shares to employees. According to this Act, employees of
commercialized State-owned Enterprises were given the
right to purchase up to 20% of the shares in the privatized
companies on preferential terms. The shares offered to the
employees were 50% cheaper than the shares offered to
Polish citizens in the form of a public offer. Under the polit-
ical pressure of the left-wing parties, a new Privatization Act
(the Law on Commercialization and Privatization of State
Enterprises) was passed by parliament in the summer of
1996. This guaranteed even greater preferences for the
employees of the privatized companies. 
The new Law stipulated that employees of privatized
companies could obtain free of charge up to 15% of the
shares in their enterprises, but the value of such shares
could not exceed the value of the 18th or 24th average
monthly salaries in the productive sector. Another 15% of
the shares were reserved and could be provided free to the
farmers or fisherman who had acted in the past as suppliers
to the privatized companies. A special stipulation also regu-
lated the free transfer of up to 15%, of shares to the
employees of the enterprises included in the National
Investment Fund program. The law on NIF was passed on
30th April 1993. However, the Act concerned only 512 of
the companies included in the program. It should be empha-
sized that these three regulations were aimed at convincing
and persuading insiders to agree on commencing the own-
ership transformation processes in their enterprises. 
According to the report of the Supreme Auditing Cham-
ber (NIK) published in 1999 [63], under the Law on Com-
mercialization and Privatization of State Enterprises, as of
30th of September 1998, free or preferential shares had
been transferred in the case of 236 companies. The total
nominal value of these stocks and shares amounted to 5.3
billion PLN (free and preferential shares were transferred
to 412,000 employees of privatized companies and 33,500
farmers and fisherman. The value of these shares amounted
to 5,277 and 0,23 billion PLN respectively). In order to esti-
mate the cost of the transfer of free shares to the employ-
ees of the privatized companies, we must also take into
consideration the Wholly-owned Treasury Companies
included in the Mass Privatization Program (MPP). As of the
end of 1996, the total book value of shares transferred to
employees and farmers and fisherman under the Law on the
National Investment Funds Program may be estimated at 1
billion PLN [64]. This estimate was based on the book value
of 512 companies included in the program at the time when
the fourth (and in fact the last) group of the companies was
included in the program. As of 30th of September 1998, the
total cost of free and preferential shares could be estimated
at 6.3 billion PLN [65]. Additionally, according to the "Priva-
tization Program to 2001" the value of free shares to be
transferred to employees and the suppliers of the privatized
companies to 2001, will amount to 8 billion PLN (see Table
6-7). However, the representatives of the Ministry of
Finance estimate that this cost will also increase and will
amount to 11 billion PLN [65]. If we summarize these fig-
ures, the total cost of the program will by then amount to
17.3 billion PLN (see Table 5-8) [66].
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Table 5-8. Assessment of the total cost of a non-equivalent privatization in the form of a distribution of free or preferential shares to
the employees of the privatized companies
The cost of free or preferential shares transferred to
the employees and suppliers of the privatized
companies in billion PLN according to:
1990-1998 1999- 1990-
- the Law on Commercialization and Privatization of State
Enterprises, enacted in 1990 and 1996
5.3 11 16.3
- the Law on National Investment Funds 1 0 1
TOTAL 6.3 11 17.3
[63] "Informacja o wynikach kontroli procesu nieodp³atnego nabywania akcji przez pracowników i innych uprawnionych w procesie prywatyzacji
przedsiêbiorstw", NIK, Warszawa, 1999.
[64] Own estimate on a base of unpublished data form the Ministry of State Treasury.
[65] Not taking into consideration the fiscal impact and the cost of the lost opportunities of the companies privatized on the preferential terms
under the MEBO scheme, but such a research has not been done yet.
[66] M. Psikorski, "Pos³owie podzielili pieni¹dze", Rzeczpospolita, 1999.10.09, Warszawa.
[67] These are only the rough estimates made by the author, as there are no systematic database available on this issue.
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However, this non-equivalent privatization scheme will
not be limited only to the transfer of free shares to the
employees and suppliers of the privatized companies. It
results from a political decision finally agreed upon by the
coalition parties (under the pressure of the senior coalition
party) [68] in March 2000. It may have enormous impact
on the overall cost of the non-equivalent privatization pro-
gram. The additional costs resulting from extending this
program were not taken into account in the "Privatization
Program to 2001" report. This program will cater for those
citizens who have not obtained any free or preferential
shares. The indirect non-equivalent privatization program
will be financed by the resources obtained from the priva-
tization process. 
Initially, the AWS party proposed that 25% of the
shares of privatizing enterprises should finance the extend-
ed non-equivalent privatization scheme. Later AWS agreed
on a figure of 9%. On the other hand, the Union of Free-
dom party did not agree to the extension of the non-equiv-
alent privatization program, arguing that financing pension
reform, the compensation program and the restitution
program from privatization sources is a kind of non-equiv-
alent privatization. Additionally, Union of Freedom under-
lined that privatization stocks are limited and it will in time
become a serious problem to fully finance already existing
social and compensation programs through the incomes
obtained from privatization. However, after long negotia-
tions the coalition parties agreed that up to 7% [69] of the
shares of privatizing enterprises (excluding those compa-
nies where the privatization process has already started)
will finance the extended non-equivalent privatization
scheme. The Minister of State Treasury, Emil W¹sacz
announced that according to preliminary estimates,
extending the indirect non-equivalent privatization pro-
gram will cost at least 3.5 billion PLN [70]. There is no data
concerning the cost of the direct non-equivalent privatiza-
tion program (e.g. the free transfer of municipal flats to
their present users), as no comprehensive and systemic
decision has been taken.
Dynamics of share of direct costs of privatization in pri-
vatization proceeds for Bulgaria and Poland presented in
Figure 5-3 reveals significant similarities. In both countries
the costs systematically have been  declining from the rela-
tively high level in early stage of privatization to the level not
exceeding 2% of revenues for Poland and about 5% for Bul-
garia.
In the case of Bulgaria, the estimate of the costs of pri-
vatization is based on the revenue side of the Fund covering
the expenses of the privatization bodies. As the share of this
fund in the allocation of revenues is determined by the Pri-
vatization Act, the share of the costs in revenues has been
on average approximately 5%. The sharp fall in 1996–1997
followed by another increase in 1998 was probably the
result of the time lag between the moment cash proceeds
were received and the moment funds were distributed to
the various funds and accounts. 
[68] The main explanation raised by the MP from the AWS was that all citizens should benefit from the privatization process, not only the employ-
ees of the productive sector.
[69] The Law stipulates that limit of 7 percent can be decreased if the assumed incomes from the privatization are not achieved in the previous
calendar year. 
[70] "7 procent akcji na uw³aszczenie", Rzeczpospolita, 08.03.2000; Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-3. Direct Costs of Privatization as % of Revenues in Bulgaria and Poland
Source: Tables in the text
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6.1. The Case of Bulgaria
The original Privatization Act [71] of 1992 outlined the
eventual practical use of the proceeds from privatization,
listing 5 non-budgetary accounts as destinations for these
revenues. 
In 1994, an amendment to the Act changed the struc-
ture of allocation and determined the shares of revenue for
each of the funds. Another amendment in 1995 rescheduled
the allocation shares to the various funds. The share of dif-
ferent funds in the allocation procedure set by the Privati-
zation Act for the two periods – before and after the
amendment of 1995 – is given in the Table  below.
In 1997, the allocation procedure for privatization rev-
enues was amended again, when the Mutual Fund was can-
celled. The same amendment introduced two more funds
to the allocation procedure – the Social Security Fund and
the Artists' Fund of the Ministry of Culture – as well as
changing the funds' shares in the allocation of privatization
revenues.
The titles of the respective funds provide a clear picture
of the actual purpose of the revenues [73] allocated.
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Part 6
Allocation of Revenues from Privatization
Table 6-1. Types of non-budgetary funds according to the original Privatization Act of 1992
Funds Share (%)
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies Not fixed*
Mutual Fund 20
Social Security Fund 30
State Fund for Reconstruction and Development Not fixed*
Support of the Agricultural Development Fund 10
Note: The 1993 Privatization Program fixed the allocation share of these two funds at 30% and 10% respectively.
Table 6-2. Types and (%) shares of non-budgetary funds in the allocation of privatization cash revenues according to the 1994 and 1995
amendments of the Privatization Act
Funds 1994 – 1995 1995 – 1996
Mutual Fund 20.0 20.0
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies 5.6 5.6
National Environmental Protection Fund 4.0 4.0
Support of the Agricultural Development Fund [72] 12.0 24.0
State Fund for Reconstruction and Development 58.4 46.4
[71] The formal name is Transformation and Privatization of State-owned and Municipal Enterprises, adopted on 8 May 1992.
[72] In 1995 Support of the Agricultural Development Fund split into two separate funds: Agriculture Fund and Tobacco Fund; after 1995 they
receive respectively 26% and 4% of the revenues.
[73]  The greatest share held the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development (SFRD). It was created in 1991 having as main aim the support
of the structural reform and the payments on the foreign debt. SFRD extended short- and medium-term credits through selected commercial banks
after the necessary money for the foreign debt payments had been allocated. Besides the privatization revenues other sources of funding for the SFRD
were credits, subsidies and transfers. In 1998 the Fund was closed following the arrangements in the Memorandum with IMF.
The Mutual Funds' money used to be transferred to the Social Security Funds by the end of the fiscal year.
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Besides, the Budget Act of 1996 proclaimed that cash rev-
enues from the privatization of 6 companies would go
directly as subsidies to medical schools, hospitals and a spe-
cial fund of the Ministry of Health (the largest of these com-
panies was sold for USD 4.05 million).
This precise regulation of privatization proceeds (except
those from "cash privatization" as described below) alloca-
tion lasted until 1999  [74], since when the revenues have
been divided between the central budget (90%) and the
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies
(10%). As a result, the Budget Act of 2000 contains the fol-
lowing truism: "Revenues from privatization of state-owned
companies shall be used for budget deficit financing and offi-
cial debt restructuring" [75]. Thus the clear division
between the spending purposes ceased to exist in the case
of privatization proceeds.
Since 1997 [76] an annual list of attractive companies
that are to be privatized only against cash payments has
been approved by the Council of Ministers. 96% of the pro-
ceeds from this so-called "cash privatization" goes directly to
the central budget and is used for official debt reduction.
The seven largest transactions for the sale of "cash privati-
zation" companies are listed in the Table  below. Altogether
these have provided USD 478 million in cash revenues,
which is 21% of all payments contracted and 34% of all cash
proceeds from privatization to the year 2000.
Allocation of Privatization Revenues 
The cash proceeds from privatization have been allocat-
ed strictly according to the procedure provided by the Pri-
vatization Act and the annual Privatization Programs (thor-
oughly described in section 4). According to these regula-
tions, privatization revenues are generally directed in two
directions:
– The central budget;
– Non-budgetary funds specified in the Privatization Act.
The allocation procedure has been constantly amended
throughout the whole privatization process. In practice, it
has passed through 6 important amendments to the Privati-
zation Act. Meanwhile, other regulations that affected the
allocation procedure (such as the Budget Acts and the Pri-
vatization Programs), were also amended.
The Table 6-5 presents the actual share allocated to the
different destinations for privatization cash proceeds. Sever-
al facts are worth noting:
– The cash proceeds gathered in the first two years of
the privatization process (1993 and 1994) were allocated
to non-budgetary funds at the end of 1994 in strict accor-
dance with the already amended procedure. Thus the pro-
cedure from the original Privatization Act of 1992, supple-
mented by the 1993 Privatization Program, was never
actually applied.
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[74] The Privatization Act was amended in the here discussed part on 12 February 1999.
[75] The 2000 Budget Act, § 5 of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions. 
[76] Amendment of the Privatization Act was made in late-1996.
Table 6-3.  Types and (%) shares of non-budgetary funds in the allocation of privatization cash revenues according to the 1997 amend-
ment of the Privatization Act
Funds 1997 – 1999
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies 10
National Environmental Protection Fund 5
Agriculture Fund 26
Tobacco Fund 4
State Fund for Reconstruction and Development 33
Social Security Fund 20
Artists’ Fund of the Ministry of Culture 2
Table 6-4. The seven largest transactions from the "cash privatization" lists
Company Sector Shares sold (%) Price (Million USD)
Sodi – Devnya Chemical industry 60 160
Neftochim – Burgas Chemical industry 58 101
MDK – Pirdop Copper production 56 80
Petrol – Sofia Chemical industry 51 52
Devnya Cement Cement production 70 45
Interpred WTC – Sofia Trade 70 20
Druzhba - Plovdiv Glass production 51 20
Total 478
Source: Privatization Agency
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– After 1995, the practice of maintaining residual funds
(remaining in the fund-raising account) emerged, i.e. the
money distributed to the funds was less than the actual cash
proceeds. The only exception to this is the year 1998 (the
negative figure for the fund-raising account is given in brack-
ets), when just the opposite happened – the money exceed-
ed the privatization revenues received.
– The allocation shares after 1995 do not follow the allo-
cation procedure as described in section 4. Three major
reasons for this exist: 
1) the allocation of the cash proceed from the 4th quar-
ter of the year takes place at the beginning of the next
year (which is also the reason for the residual funds
described above); 
2) the amendments to the allocation procedure are
often introduced in the middle of the year and applied
directly, i.e. the percentage share resembles neither the
amended or the newly applied procedure;
3) after 1997, "cash privatization" appeared. Meanwhile,
the allocation procedure remained active for the non-
cash privatization proceeds. However, in the Table
above, the percentage shared is calculated on the basis
of the total privatization revenues for the respective
year.
Although the titles of funds provide a reasonably clear
idea of the use of the cash proceeds from privatization, in
the following paragraph we examine more closely the even-
tual allocation of the privatization money, as well as some of
the important features of the allocation procedure.
The non-budgetary Fund covering the expenses of the
central privatization bodies was administered by the Privati-
zation Agency. It existed until 1998 when it split into sepa-
rate funds for the separate bodies.
The Privatization Act established the Mutual Fund in
1992, the main idea being to use the collected funds for the
Social Security Fund and the Fund for compensation of for-
mer owners. From the end of 1995, the money collected in
the Mutual Fund was allocated to the Social Security Fund
for pensions [77]. The Fund was canceled in 1997 [78] and
the money collected so far was to be redistributed to the
Social Security Fund.
Besides the Social Security Fund, another mandatory
insurance fund was eligible for privatization proceeds allo-
cation, namely the Professional Qualification and Unem-
ployment Fund. However, no explicit data is available on
distinction between their shares (thus in the Table above,
they are listed as Social Security Funds). Since mid 1998, no
less than 50% of the money for the social security funds
was due to go to the National Health Insurance Fund.
The 1996 Budget Act [79] postulated that the revenues
from the privatization of 6 specific companies should be
allocated in the following special way:
– To the Ministry of Health Care Fund, to cover the cost
of life-sustaining medicines already used in 1996 – up to
BGN 4.5 million.
– To medical schools and university hospitals, to cover
heating and electricity costs, as well as the costs of medi-
cines – up to BGN 1.3 million.
[77] According to § 35 of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions of the Amendment of the Privatization Act of 15 December 1995.
[78] Amendment of the Privatization Act of 7 October 1997.
[79] Actually § 6 of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions of the Amendment of the Budget Act of 20 December 1996.
Table 6-5.  Actual Allocation of Privatization Revenues (Percentage share of cash proceeds)
Destination 1993-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central Budget - - - 84.2 54.0 65.7
Fund covering the expenses of the central
privatization bodies
5.6 4.5 2.1 0.6 5.6 5.9
Support of the Agricultural Development
Fund
- 9.2 - - - -
Mutual Fund 20.0 12.2 19.5 0.4 - -
National Environmental Protection Fund 4.0 3.2 1.5 0.4 2.8 -
Agriculture Fund 12.0 0.6 7.9 2.1 14.7 -
Tobacco Fund - 0.1 1.2 0.3 2.3 -
State Fund for Reconstruction and
Development
58.4 46.1 17.5 4.6 18.1 -
Artists’ Fund of the Ministry of Culture - - 5.9 - 1.1 -
Social Security Fund - - - 2.5 10.7 -
Universities, ministries and hospitals - - - 1.7 1.2 -
Fund-raising budgetary account - 24.1 44.4 3.2 (10.5) 28.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance
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– To orphanages, to cover food costs – up to 0.3 million. 
In 1996, the revenue from the above mentioned 6 com-
panies barely reached BGN 0.5 million and this was in its
entirety allocated to the Ministry of Health Care.
By August 1997, all the above mentioned six companies
had been sold. At that time the allocation of the cash pro-
ceeds from their privatization was roughly:
– Ministry of Health Care – USD 1.5 million;
– Medical schools and university hospitals – USD 2 mil-
lion;
– Orphanages – USD 0.2 million.
The funds remaining at the end of 1998 were allocated
to the medical schools and the university hospitals.
In 1997 [80] a brand new article was introduced to the
Privatization Act to regulate the allocation of cash proceeds
from privatization-related activities, as well as the allocation
of money from forfeits for breach of privatization contracts.
The allocation procedure was as follows:
– To the Fund covering the expenses of the central pri-
vatization bodies – revenue from events associated with
the privatization process (sale of memoranda, auction
documentation, advertising, publishing and other activi-
ties) as well as any auction/tender/negotiation deposits
appropriated.
– To the State Fund for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment – forfeits for breach of the clauses regarding invest-
ments in privatization contracts.
– To the Social Security Fund and compensation for
former owners – forfeits for breach of the clauses regard-
ing jobs in privatization contracts.
– To the Central Budget – forfeits [81] for breach of
the clauses regarding other commitments in privatization
contracts.
This procedure has since been amended twice.
Presently, cash proceeds from privatization-related activi-
ties go in two directions – to the Fund covering the
expenses of the central privatization bodies and the Cen-
tral Budget (all the forfeits for breach of privatization con-
tracts).
Funds from the privatization of separate units and build-
ings under construction, undistributed since 30 June 1994,
may remain at the disposal of a company after a deduction
of 20% to the Mutual Fund, where approved is granted by
the respective central privatizing body. On the one hand,
this new regulation has limited the revenue from privatiza-
tion that is allocated to supporting the agriculture industry,
ecological purposes, reconstruction and development, but
on the other hand, has had a positive effect by aiding these
companies' rehabilitation and making them more attractive
to investors. Moreover, since late 1997 the revenues from
the sale of separate units have remained in the hands of the
respective company [82].
6.2. The Case of Poland
Since the "Privatization Program up to 2001" was pre-
pared in 1998, before the introduction of the social and
compensation programs, the Ministry of Finance has had to
update its estimates and prognoses of the costs of these
programs. According to the new projections, the cost of the
social programs to be covered by the privatization revenues
will be much higher than was assumed in the "Privatization
program to 2001".
First of all, the cost of the restitution program is still
not known, as the agreement concerning to what extent
it is to be financed has not yet been reached by the Gov-
ernment, the unions and the associations of former own-
ers. If we consider the most optimistic scenario [83]
(meeting a partial – 50% fulfillment of the restitution
claims) and the only one considered by the Ministry of
Finance, this would result in the cost of the restitution
program being much higher than was planned in the "Pri-
vatization Program to 2001". The cost of the program will
be at least 25–35 billion PLN more and amount to 95 bil-
lion PLN [84].
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[80] Amendment of the Privatization Act of 7 October 1997.
[81] For full description of forfeits procedure and practice see "Evaluation of the Post-Privatization Monitoring System in Bulgaria", CASE and IME,
March 2000.
[82] Amendment of the Privatization Act of 19 December 1997.
[83] Optimistic form the public finance point of view.
[84] "Kierunki Prywatyzacji Skarbu Pañstwa w 2000 r.", The Ministry of State Treasury, Warsaw, 1999.
Table 6-6.   The cost of pension reform in particular years
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cost in Billion PLN 4 11 13 16.9 18.5
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2000
53
Fiscal Effects from Privatization ...
Secondly, the cost of  pension reform will be much high-
er than was initially planned (Table  6-6). This is a result of
the very poor implementation of the program by the ruling
parties (it being initially implemented by politicians and not
economists) and the financial condition of ZUS (the State
Agency of Social Insurance) being even more catastrophic
than had been expected. According to the Ministry of
Finance, the cost of pension reform to 2001 will amount to
28 billion PLN and will be 8 billion PLN higher during this
period than was planned in 1998. At present, the Ministry of
Finance estimates that the cost of pension reform will
exceed 63 billion PLN by 2003 (the Privatization Program
to 2001 assumed that the cost of pension reform would
amount to 54 billion PLN by 2005). 
Thirdly, the ruling political forces, under pressure from
the senior coalition party (AWS), have reached an agree-
ment on a more comprehensive non-equivalent privatiza-
tion scheme than was expected in 1998. 
Fourthly, incomes from privatization still support the
current budgetary expenditures. For example, the Ministry
of Finance earmarked 5.58 billion PLN to cover the bud-
getary deficit in 2000.
If we compare the costs of the programs included in the
"Privatization Program to 2001" with the present estimates
or the real cost already incurred, only the cost of the com-
pensation program is going to be lower than was initially
expected. The Ministry of Finance has explained that the
most pessimistic scenario was taken into consideration. The
real cost of the program will be 7 billion PLN lower than
was originally expected and will amount to 13 billion PLN. 
To summarize, expectations regarding the value of State
property are still enormously high, despite the fact that the
transformation process began over 10 years ago. On the
other hand, the cost of the programs financed by privatiza-
tion revenues is going to be very high.
The value of State property was optimistically estimated
in the "Privatization Program to 2001" at almost 233 billion
PLN. Moreover, the State Treasury in 1998 obtained 13 bil-
lion PLN and in 1999 over 20 billion PLN from privatization.
We might therefore theoretically assume that the State will
obtain approximately 200 billion from privatization. In fact,
as mentioned earlier, these estimates are too optimistic and
there is a real threat that the potential privatization rev-
enues will be much lower. 
At present, the total cost of the major social programs
alone should be estimated at 185.5 billion PLN [87]. How-
ever, these are still very rough estimates, as the organization
of the restitution program has yet to be determined. The
adoption of any particular plan for the restitution program
may dramatically change all predictions and estimates.
Moreover, we should not forget about the privatization rev-
enues consumed by the budget. For example, this year the
central budget will consume over 5 billion PLN.
More threatening is the fact that the costs of social pro-
grams are growing systematically (Table 6-7 presents a com-
parison of the assumed cost of social programs financed by
privatization revenues as of 1st May 2000 and the cost pre-
sented in the "Privatization Program up to 2001"). Although it
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Table 6-7.  Comparison of the assumed cost of social programs financed by privatization revenues as of 1st May 2000 and that presented
in the "Privatization Program up to 2001"
No. Program Privatization
Program to 2001-
in billion PLN
Expected cost
- in billion PLN
[85]1
Difference
1. Financial support for pension reform
- to 2005
- to 2001
54.0
20.3
63 [86]
28
9
7.7
2. Compensation program for non-productive State
sector employees and pensioners
20.0 13 - 7
3. Restitution (re-privatization) program
- total cost
- fund for meeting indirect claims
60-70
17.0
95
20.1
25-35
4. Non-equivalent privatization program
- the cost of transferring free and preferential shares
- extension of the non-equivalent privatization
program
8.0
0
11
3.5
3.0
Source: "Privatization Program to 2001", Ministry of the Treasury, 1998
[85] Estimates as of 1 May 2000. In order to make these data comparable the cost of the particular programs occurred already in 1998 and 1999
were included.
[86] The cost of the pension system reform only up to 2003.
[87] Considering the cost of the pension reform only up to 2005.
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is very difficult to fully compare the cost of the programs to
be financed from incomes obtained from privatization, since
for some programs the time horizon of some estimates can-
not be compared, the cost projections presented in the Pri-
vatization Program are much lower (more optimistic) than
the present estimates of the Ministry of Finance. It is clear that
the cost of pension reform will be higher. The same applies to
the non-equivalent privatization program. Only the cost of
the compensation program will probably be lower. 
In fact, according to the estimates presented above the
real threat exists that there is already insufficient money to
cover the cost of  all existing social programs that were sup-
posed to be covered by the sources obtained from privati-
zation. As a result, there is no possibility of fully meeting the
restitution claims, as the privatization revenues are already
very limited and the budget will never manage to bear such
a painful burden.
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Comparison of fiscal dimension of privatization
process in Bulgaria and in Poland reveals both similarities
and differences. On the contrary to Poland, where priva-
tization proceeds have been one of the highest priorities
of the privatization strategy, fiscal objectives have rarely
been referred to as a priority in the modeling and execu-
tion of Bulgaria's privatization policy.
In practice, privatization revenues in Bulgaria and in
Poland constitute a continuously increasing part of total
budget revenues and therefore, their fiscal effects are sig-
nificant in the planning of the budget and economic policy
in both countries.
Indirect privatization in Poland and cash case-by-case
privatization in Bulgaria are the main source of revenues.
In the last three years, the share of the largest privatiza-
tion contracts in total privatization revenues in Poland, to
lesser extend in Bulgaria,  has increased sharply. Howev-
er, since the number of large and strong companies is lim-
ited, one should not treat privatization as a source of sub-
stantial  budget revenues over the long term. 
The privatization revenues structure in both countries
is characterized by relatively high level of concentration,
measured by the number of major providers of revenues.
In case of Poland, especially since mid-90ties, major
providers, as a rule, became the privatized banks. This is
not the case of Bulgaria, where major providers have
been exclusively industrial enterprises. 
Governments of both countries tend to underestimate
future privatization revenues. This would seem to be the
result of two factors: unexpected changes on financial
markets and excessive caution on the part of the govern-
ment in planning revenues, which does not need to be
intentional. For both the countries under discussion, this
is the best way to create government reserves that could
be used to cover gaps in current expenditures. 
There were significant differences between Bulgaria
and Poland policy with regard to the allocation of the rev-
enues from privatization. Actually, both countries uses
principally different approaches, changing over the entire
period from the very beginning of the privatization
process. Formally, according to regulations, privatization
revenues in Bulgaria suppose to be directed to the central
budget and to strictly specified non-budgetary funds. In
practice,  the allocation procedure has been constantly
amended throughout the whole privatization process.
While the privatization revenues in Bulgaria were and still
are used to cover the gap in current governmental expen-
diture and to reduce official debt, in Poland for the last
two-three years privatization proceeds are to be used for
covering costs of the implementation of large social pro-
grams.
Foreign investment constituted an important part of
privatization revenues and seems to be mainly driven by
occasional large privatization contracts. However, in the
contrary to Bulgaria, where  foreign investments amount-
ed to 42% of the total FDI volume for the period
1993–1999, in Poland privatization proceeds from foreign
investors are not a large part of total FDI, due to the rel-
atively high total volume of foreign investments in the Pol-
ish economy.
A variety of payment instruments were used in Bul-
garia in the privatization deals, including foreign and
domestic debt bonds. This broadens the gap between the
total financial effect reported and the actual budget rev-
enues from privatization. However, recently there are
signs of improved revenue strategy in Bulgaria, resulted in
the higher cash share in the 1999 payments.  A factor
which supports this development is also the lower share
of MEBO's in the total deals concluded. Contrary to the
situation in Bulgaria, cash is the main payment instrument
in the Polish privatization process.
Direct costs of privatization in both countries are rel-
atively small and constitute a decreasing fraction of priva-
tization revenues. The costs of privatization in Bulgaria
were on average 3.7% of the total cash revenues from
privatization. The greatest costs have been connected
with the implementation of the process, when the cost of
the capital privatization in Poland amounted to 21% of
privatization revenues, following which the cost began to
fall to the level of about 2% in 1998 and 1% in 1999.
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Table. Major Polish revenue providers and their share in total privatization revenues in the years 1993–1999 (millions of PLN)
Year 1993 1994 1995
Name of company Branch of
industry
Price Name of
company
Branch of
industry
Price Name of company Branch of industry Price
GÓRA¯D¯E Cement 73.74 BSK S.A. Banking 425.00 STOMIL OL. Tyres 344.00
TELETRA Electronics 35.23 STALEXPORT International
Trade
168.30 TYTOÑ AUG. Tobacco 220.50
KABLE-BYD. Cables 32.39 STOMIL-DÊB Tyres 91.40 WINIARY KAL. Food 178.10
CEMENT STRZ. OP. Cement 31.60 SAN Food 68.40 TYTOÑ RAD. Tobacco 153.30
TELEKOM WA. Electronics 30.18 JELFA Pharmaceuticals 57.80 CEMENT. O¯. Cement 140.60
The largest:
1 as a percentage of total
privatization revenues
9.4% 26.6% 13.0%
3 as a percentage of total
privatization revenues
18.1% 42.9% 28.1%
5 as a percentage of total
privatization revenues
26.0% 50.8% 39.2%
Year 1996 1997 1998
Name of company Branch of
industry
Price Name of
company
Branch of
industry
Price Name of company Branch of industry Price
ZPT Kraków Tobacco 579.75 HANDLOWY Banking 1667.10 TP S.A. Telecommunications 3146.60
WPT Poznañ Tobacco 305.70 KGHM Copper Mining 1348.40 Pekao S.A. Bank 916.10
Browary Tyskie Brewing 211.05 PBK Bank 1006.60 Polfa Poznañ Pharmaceuticals 770.33
- - ŒWIECIE Pulp/paper 693.30 Fabryka  £o¿ysk
"Iskra"
Metallurgy
Industry/Sheaves
158.80
- - POLFA KR. Pharmaceuticals 389.00 DT Centrum Retail trade 106,1
The largest:
1 as a percentage of total
privatization revenues
15.5% 25.5% 37.8%
3 as a percentage of total
privatization revenues
29.2% 61.5% 58.0%
5 as a percentage of total
privatization revenues
- 78.1% 60.0%
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Table. Major Bulgarian revenue providers and their share in total privatization revenues in the years 1993–1999 (millions of USD)
1993 m USD Total contractual payments  44 m USD %
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Tzarevichni Producti -
Razgrad
food industry  20,00 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
45,0
Svoboda - Kristal -
Kamenovo
food industry  4,39 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
60,0
Republika - Svoge food industry  2,00 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
66,0
Nektar - Silistra food industry  1,38
Odiana - Sofia  1,29
1994 Total contractual payments  144m USD
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Hotel Vitosha-Sofia tourism  41,80 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
29,0
Zagorka - Stara Zagora brewery  21,70 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
50,6
Grand Hotel Varna tourism  9,36 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
61,2
SOMAT- Sofia transport  8,22
Chimimport trade  7,05
1995 Total contractual payments  114m USD
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Burgasko Pivo - Burgas brewery  5,02 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
4,4
Astika brewery  5,00 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
13,1
Kamenitza Plovdiv brewery  4,88 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
18,7
Prima Lakta-Lovech food industry  3,48
Kabel Komers Burgas el.engineering  2,99
1996 Total contractual payments  185 m USD
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Sheraton - Sofia tourism  22,30 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
12,1
Aroma cosmetics  8,41 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
20,7
Eltos - Lovech el.engineering  7,65 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
27,6
Energokabel el.engineering  7,23
Vidima Sevlievo sanitary fittings  5,40
1997 Total contractual payments  572 m USD
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Sody Devnya chemical ind.  160,00 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
28,0
MDK - Pirdop copper prod.  80,00 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
49,7
Devnya Cement-Devnya cement prod.  44,55 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
55,0
Interpret WTC - Sofia trade  20,00
Albena resort - Balchik tourism  10,11
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Table. Major Bulgarian revenue providers and their share in total privatization revenues in the years 1993–1999 (millions of USD)
1998 Total contractual payments  585 m USD
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Druzhba JSCo.-Plovdiv glass  20,00 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
3,4
Somat -Sofia transport  13,70 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
8,0
Polimeri - Devnia chemical ind.  12,95 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
11,9
Novotel Evropa-Sofia tourism  12,05
Riviera - Varna tourism  11,00
1999 Total contractual payments  646 m USD
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Neftochim JSCo. Bourgas chemical ind.  101,00 1 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
15,6
Petrol JSCo.-sofia Chemical ind.  52,00 3 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
25,4
Pharmacia - Dupnica pharmaceutical  11,00 5 as the percent of total privatization
revenues
27,6
Troyapharm JSCo-
Troyan
pharmaceutical  7,35
Sviloza - Svistov chemical ind.  7,00
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Table. Brady Bonds, to be used in  privatization deals in Bulgaria, issued under an Agreement with the London Club since March 1994
Front Loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRB)
Issuing date 28 July 1994
Maturity date 28 July 2012
Volume of emission USD 1 658 million
Interest coupon: Floating
- tranche ? 1 - 2-year: 2%; 3 - 4-year: 2.25%; 5-year: 2.5%; 6-year: 2.75%; 7-year: 3%; from 8-year
to date of payment: 6-month LIBOR (USD) + 13/16
- tranche ? The same scheme as  tranche A + additional 0.5% for each separate payment
Basis 30 / 360 for fixed interest payments and actual days number / 360 for payments with
floating interest rate
Interest payment dates 28 January and 28 July
Principal payment 8-year grace period, followed by payment scheme with 21 equal 6-month installments,
starting since 29 July 2002
Interest payment collateral Allowed are investments in securities, which are denominated in USD and cover the value
of interest payments from 1 to 7-year altogether.  Volume of collateral is 2.6% of initial
principal value and the incomes are on behalf of creditors for covering one-year interests,
which are based on 3% of principal.
Collateral institution Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Face value of one bond USD 250 000
Type Global. Transferable on installments not less than USD 1 000 or divisible to USD 1 000.
In form of Payable to bearer or book entry
Place of registration Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Settlement Euroclear, Cedel or presenting sovereign bonds; Citibank for collateral securities
 Discount Bonds (DISC)
Issuing date 28 July 1994
Maturity date 28 July 2024
Volume of emission USD 1 850 million
Total volume of tranche ? USD 1 685 million
Total volume of tranche ? USD 165 million
Interest coupon: Floating
- tranche ? 6-month LIBOR (USD) + 13/16
- tranche ? 6-month LIBOR (USD) + 13/16 + 0.5%
Basis Actual days number for the period / 360
Interest payment date 28 January and 28 July
Principal payment Single at the date of payment
Collateral:
- on principal U.S. Treasury Bonds with zero coupon and 30-year maturity.
- on interest Annually reinvested U.S. Treasury Bills with 1-year maturity, which cover the-yearly
interest payments based on 7 % of residual principal.
Collateral institution Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Face value of one bond USD 250 000
Type Global. Transferable on installments not less than USD 1 000 or divisible to USD 1 000.
In form of: Book entry
Place of registration Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Settlement Euroclear, Cedel or presenting sovereign bonds; Citibank for collateral securities.
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Table. Domestic bonds, to be used in privatization deals in Bulgaria 
Regulation CMDecree N
244/91
CMDecree N
186/93
Article 4
ZUNK/93
Article 5
ZUNK/93
CMDecree N 3/94
Emission
number
BG 2000192224 BG 2009993226 BG 2009893228 BG 2009794228 BG 2009693222
Date of
issuing
01.1.1992 01.7.1993 01.10.1993 01.1.1994 01.12.1993
Date of
payment
01.1.2011 01.7.2017 01.10.2018 01.1.2019 01.12.2018
Maturity in
years
19 24 25 25 25
Grace period
in years
4 4 5 5 5
Period of
payment in
years
15 20 20 20 20
Installments 15 equal annual
installments
20 equal annual
installments
20 equal annual
installments
20 equal annual
installments
20 equal annual
installments
Principal value
in thousands
BGL 3 302.08 BGL 2 301.90 BGL 8 346.69 USD 494.91 BGL 884.77
Interest
payment
6-month 6-month 6-month 6-month 12-month
Interest rate
in 1999
Basic Interest Rate
+1
2/3 Basic Interest
Rate
2/3 Basic Interest
Rate
LIBOR 2/3 Basic Interest
Rate
* Principal value is according to actual data of 31 December 1999
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